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Abstract 
Since the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and Deng Xiaoping in 1997, factionalism and power 
struggle as the characteristic of leadership change in China has ended. Although factionalism 
still exists, it has been converted to collaboration among all factions within the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP). The election of Xi Jinping to the presidency of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) and to the position as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) is therefore, as the result of cooperation among factions. This paper discusses 
various challenges, including nationalism as the most serious issue faced by Xi Jinping as a 
leader elected through compromise. 
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Introduction 
 
Change of leadership in countries 
practicing single party dictatorship is 
usually marred with power struggle. China, 
especially during the era of Mao Zedong 
(1949-1976) and Deng Xiaoping (1978-1997) 
was not exception to this rule. The causes of 
this phenomenon could be personal 
ambition, personal relationship among 
leaders, policy differences, fragmentation 
within the ruling party or more popularly 
known as factionalism, and other factors. 
Post-Mao/Deng China, however, seems not 
to follow this tradition anymore. Even if 
power struggle persists, it is no longer an 
“open warfare” known to the public but 
carried out within closed doors. 
The election of Xi Jinping as General 
Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) as the result of the 18th Congress of 
the party in November 2012 and his 
appointment as the President of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the 
outcome of the 14th National People’s 
Congress (NPC) on March 14, 2013 
consolidated his position, because in 
addition to the General Secretary of the 
CCP and the President of the PRC, he is also 
Chairman of the Military Commission. 
Transition of leadership from the 4th to the 
5th generation of leader is therefore, 
complete and he is the most powerful 
person in the country of 1,4 billion people. 
However, even though the change of 
leadership can be said as smooth. It doesn’t 
mean that dissent among various wings of 
the Party has gone. In the past, Mao and 
Deng eliminated any different opinion 
within the ranks by harsh means. Series of 
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political campaigns during the era of 
Mao(1949-1976) and 1989 suppression of 
Tiananmen protest are proofs on how in the 
past different opinions were denied.   
Post–Deng/Mao leadership however,  
regard different opinions within ranks and 
files as positive as long as differing opinios 
do not develop into what Mao called as 
“antagonistic contradiction” (diwo maodun). 
Dissent is therefore tolerated as long as it is 
within “party lines.” With the reemergence 
of factionalism, all big decisions, like the 
appointment of leaders, formulation of 
policies and their actualizations have to be 
discussed among factions.   
Thus, the appointment of Xi Jinping as 
the leader of China, is therefore the result of 
compromise among factions. So is his 
policies. Based on the above considerations 
and facts, this paper will deal with 
challenges faced by Xi from both within and 
without the Party. These will include 
factionalism itself, Xi as the leader, and 
other factors he has to deal with. 
This paper is written based on 
qualitative method and supported by data, 
both English and Chinese sources, available 
through library and internet search. 
 
 
Who is Xi Jinping? 
 
Western Press and of course China’s 
own media have all dubbed Xi Jinping as a 
great diplomat who has been able to 
influence and gain the trust of all circles 
including the army. And because Xi is the 
descendant of let’s say a “lord” in the 
dynasty of Chinese leaders, the Chinese 
press have named him the ‘crown prince of 
the people’. Therefore, his appointment as 
Secretary General and as president this, was 
considered the right choice. As an 
“aristocrat” in the Chinese leadership, he is 
known to all the levels of the society, 
coupled with his impressive experience as a 
local and national official before occupying 
his present number one position. 
Even Nicholas Kristoff (2013), a senior 
analyst that usually very critical 
perspectives of Chinese politics, has a 
positive impression of Xi Jinping and refers 
to him as a genuine reformer. Kristoff’s 
opinion is based on several factors. First, Xi 
already has the spirit of a reformer 
implanted in him. He has inherited this 
from his father, the late Xi Zhongxun, a 
pioneer in economic development who 
openly condemns the Tian’anmen Square 
massacre in 1989. His mother chose to stay 
in Shenzhen, the most capitalistic region. Xi 
also sent his daughter to Harvard 
University, which, Kristoff said, proved his 
personal perception of the importance of 
English and his admiration for the 
American education system. Kristoff also 
speculate about the possibility of Xi 
releasing Liu Xiaobo, the critical author and 
Nobel Prize winner who is now languishing 
in jail. Xi is also quite attentive and listens 
to public demands for a more transparent 
government. In fact, it is likely that he will 
abolish detention and punishment not 
preceded by judicial process. Kristoff 
further speculates that one of his main 
programs is to move the body of Mao which 
is preserved and now still on display in the 
mausoleum in Tiananmen Square. This is 
meant to eradicate the tradition of the cult 
of personality in the Chinese political 
system. 
With the election of Xi Jinping for a 
period of up to 10 years, the leadership of 
the party and the country has moved from 
4th to 5th Generation. One of the 
characteristics of the 5th Generation  is the 
fact that they grew up, experienced and 
suffered during the Cultural 
Revolution(C.R.) launched by Mao (1966-
1976). Xi is not exempt from this 
phenomenon because of the effects of the 
massive campaigns which occurred over the 
longest period in the history of Mao’s 
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leadership involving not only ordinary 
people but also the elite and their families. 
Even Deng Xiaoping, the architect of 
reform, and his family, suffered.  
Holding various positions in the party 
leadership over that period of 25 years, his 
career continued to soar (Callahan, 2012). At 
first he was made the party secretary in 
Hebei province (1983-85), a backward and 
poor province. Then he was placed in the 
two prosperous provinces of Fujian (1985-
2002) and Zhejiang (2002-07). In both 
provinces, he managed to launch an anti-
corruption campaign earning him the 
nickname "Mr. Clean."  
In 2007, he was stationed in Shanghai 
and in this Metropolitan city of South 
China, he was considered to have 
succeeded in eradicating corruption. Due to 
those success stories he was called to Beijing 
to take over the party leadership. His career 
continued to rise with his appointment as 
vice president under Hu Jintao in March 
2008. 
Xi Jinping was born in Beijing in 1953 
when his father was serving as head of the 
CCP's Central Propaganda Department and 
concurrently Deputy Minister of Education 
and Culture. Thus from his childhood Xi 
junior grew up in an elite community and 
school environment. He was a member of 
the so-called cynics of "the red aristocracy".  
Westerners called them “princelings” or 
taizi in Chinese. Their number today is 
estimated at 300 people and they were the 
ones who used their positions or guanxi 
(connections) and networking to get quality 
education, which in turn secured them 
promising career paths in various fields.  
However, Xi Jinping made an 
extraordinary move. When other members 
of the aristocracy plunged into business to 
reap abundant wealth, he used those 
connections to achieve a position in politics. 
When the C.R. erupted, Xi Jinping was just 
15 years old, and as a "child of counter-
revolutionaries" he was sent to the rural 
Shaanxi province to do forced labor and to 
"learn from the peasants”.  
Towards the end of the Cultural 
Revolution, he avoided the frantic 
atmosphere of the capital because everyone 
was jockeying for a position to show case 
themselves as revolutionaries to get Mao’s 
attention and get good positions in the 
party and government. His career 
continued to escalate and in 1983 he chose a 
career that would place him in the regions. 
In rural Shaanxi, due to his 
organizational skills, he was able to secure 
the peasants’ admiration who then 
appointed him party secretary of the village 
he was working in. Because of his 
capabilities, towards the end of the CR he 
obtained a recommendation to study at a 
university – an opportunity that is rarely 
obtained by a descendant of a "counter-
revolutionary".  
After earning an engineering degree 
from Qinghua University, one of China’s 
leading university in Beijing, he was 
appointed Deputy Secretary of the CCP in 
Zhengding county, Hebei province, a place 
that was still very backward. 
However, an opportunity arose which 
Xi so cleverly used. Zhengding had been 
used as the setting of a television series 
adaptation of the classic Chinese novel 
Honglou Mengor better known in the West 
as the Dream of the Red Chamber. The 
television serial which was spiced up with 
slight episodes of sex became very popular 
entertainment for the people. Xi cleverly 
turned the former TV series production set 
into a tourist object making Zhengding a 
successful tourist destination.  
At that time all development programs 
were still under central planning and tourist 
destinations were limited to the Forbidden 
City, the Summer Palace, the Great Wall or 
Bataling (burial place) of the Ming emperors 
in Beijing. Because of his expertise, the 
Chinese media praised Xi as a person with a 
soul and spirit of a reformer and pioneer.  
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Chinese media also praised Xi as a leader 
who embraced the philosophy of reform. 
He continued what his father had 
pioneered by turning several cities in the 
south into "special economic zones." As the 
mayor of Xiamen in 1985 he encouraged the 
development of trade relations with 
Taiwan, which was just opposite the city. Xi 
held that position for 17 years and the 
economic chain between the two sides of 
the Taiwan Straits grew rapidly, in spite of 
their ideological opposition. In 2002 he 
brought this pioneering and reformist spirit 
to the Zhijiang province whose economy 
was growing smoothly.  
Xi’s leadership became more open and 
more reformist as reflected in his acceptance 
speech after his election, "Our people love 
life and hope for better education, steady 
jobs, better incomes, reliable social security, 
high standards of healthcare, as well as 
pleasant living conditions and environment. 
They expect their children to grow, work, 
and live better lives. People long for a life 
that is good and beautiful; that's what we 
must strive for" (Xinhua, 2012). 
However, looking at the constellation of 
forces within the CCP, this praise may be 
somewhat exaggerated and its validity 
remains to be tested. There is still a lot that 
he needs to do in order to secure a 
productive leadership, and it obviously will 
take time. One of the main causes of this is 
none other than the factionalism within the 
CCP and various other challenges faced by 
him. 
 
 
Factionalism 
 
First it should be noted that the CCP is 
not a monolithic organization because it 
was always plagued by factionalism—this is 
no strange matter for a party with no rivals. 
In the Mao era there were only two factions 
which were always competing to determine 
policy. That is what experts outside China 
called a radical wing versus a moderate 
wing. And because the position of 
"Chairman Mao" as "a great leader of the 
revolution" was so dominant, radicalism 
always had the upper hand. Mao was 
therefore able to determine all policies 
freely and arbitrarily in all areas. The basis 
of all decision-making was also simple 
because the only reference was ideology. 
Factionalism within the CCP is now 
much more complex. Its appearance is 
based on place of origins, education and 
training, and family background, although 
there are also groups who base their 
movement on ideology, especially Maoism. 
With the changing times, today in the post-
Mao/Deng PKC there are least four main 
factions that competing each other.  First is 
the Shanghai faction, known as Haipai, who 
gather around Jiang Zemin the PRC 
President and the CCP General Secretary 
during the 1992-2002 period, the former 
boss of the Shanghai CCP branch who was 
personally designated by the late Deng 
before his death to succeed him. 
This faction is known as a champion for 
increasing the fruits of development. The 
main idea of the Shanghai group is 
essentially to keep the rate of economic 
development at the highest level. According 
to them, in order to maintain China’s 
position as a world economic power when 
global competition is so tight, coastal areas 
should remain a priority as the machine of 
economic development.  
This is the reason for their lack of 
concern for segments of society and regions 
of China that are still lagging behind in 
various fields. The concepts of this group 
are focused on the ideas of Jiang Zemin 
about the Three Representatives (san ge 
daibiao) which suggests to give the 
opportunity to entrepreneurs (read: 
capitalist) emerging after the launching of 
the reform, to become members of the CCP. 
The Shanghai faction conceptually 
competed with the Young Communist 
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League alumni group, one of the party’s 
organizations whose primary objective was 
to prepare young people to become future 
leaders. In Chinese politics they are called 
the Faction League or tuanpai. Political 
analysts from the West often referred to 
them as "populists."  The principles adopted 
by tuanpai are strengthening and 
consolidating the power of the central 
leadership, preserving and maintaining 
social stability, trying to distribute the fruits 
of development to eliminate significant 
differences between developed areas and 
underdeveloped areas, reducing the wide 
gap between the poor and the rich, and 
healing every social disease caused by the 
capitalization of the Chinese economy. 
The group is led by former Party chief 
Hu Jintao and the concept of sharing the 
fruits of development was incorporated into 
his theory of creating a "harmonious 
society" (Leonard 2008). By using this 
discourse, they emphasized the importance 
of eliminating the gaping differences 
between the advanced and the backward 
regions and classes.  
In addition to the two wings that hold 
opposing concepts, there is another group 
of younger people who are often referred to 
as the "princes". As a group within the 
Chinese political scene they got the name 
taizipai and Western observers referred to 
them as princelings. This group consisted of 
about 300 people with an average age of 50-
60 years. They were the sons/daughters of 
veterans who were comrades of Mao 
Zedong during the revolution to establish 
the CCP and the PRC.  
Due to their position as the elite, they 
were fortunate to obtain a good education, 
and thanks to their guanxi, they successfully 
occupied important positions in the party 
and government. However, it should be 
noted that the strategic positions they 
occupied were not merely due to heredity 
or guanxi alone, but came with education, 
business, and experience they acquired as 
regional and central authorities or by being 
engaged in bureaucracy and business. 
Bo Xilai, the former party boss of 
Chongqing, is another taizi figure who 
joined the group aspiring to maintain the 
teachings of Mao Zedong. He was eager to 
revive all Mao’s teachings in the city he led. 
Unfortunately, behind this mask of Maoism, 
he was involved in degrading practices 
such as violations of human rights and 
corruption.  
Linked to Bo Xilai, there was another 
elite group aspiring to preserve the 
teachings of the late Mao which emphasized 
ideological purity and the concept of 
equality in a classless society. The initiators 
of this movement are mainly senior 
revolutionaries who fear that the 
introduction of Deng’s reforms will lead the 
society further away from the ideals of 
egalitarianism initiated by Mao. However, 
since the fall of Bo Xilai, the group is now in 
a much weaker position and their influence 
is receding. Thus in China's political arena 
there are now two main groups competing, 
the Shanghai faction and the faction 
supported by most of the league of the 
"princes". The Shanghai faction actually 
represents the concept of thinking of those 
outside the central government in Beijing, 
while the league reflects concepts of what 
must be done to manage the dynamics of 
the central government in developing the 
Chinese community in connection with 
China's entry into the arena of globalization. 
Interestingly, the rivalry between these 
two schools has its own historical 
background. China is a country with such a 
vast territory that is has a diversity of 
geographic and human features. Thus, the 
existence of a central government in the 
North is a necessity for maintaining unity 
and political unity.   
However, throughout history, political 
unity has often been disrupted and in some 
cases even developed into separatism. This 
occurred because some regions have their 
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own ambitions and interests.  Not 
infrequently this led them to achieve their 
ambitions by cooperating with outside 
forces. The case of warlordism (1924-1927) 
in China is an example of this pattern. 
Tensions between the centralist and 
regionalist groups in the past have led to 
increasing conflicts between the North 
based in Beijing and the South led by 
Shanghai.  
In the Mao era, Shanghai which is 
located in the South was known as a center 
of radical extremists under the leadership of 
Mao's wife, Jiang Qing while the North 
(Beijing) was a fortress of those who were 
stamped by Mao as bureaucrats and 
revisionists. When he felt his position was 
coming under escalating political pressure, 
Mao usually went to the South (Shanghai) 
to gather power and returned to Beijing to 
reclaim his influential position.  
From a modern perspective, this conflict 
is characterized by the conflict of ideas 
between Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin as 
reflected in the conflict between the ideas of 
the elitists versus the populists. However, if 
the first discourse was concerned with 
political opposition and the revolution, it 
has now turned into an economic discourse.  
It is also important to keep in mind that 
although there are conceptual differences as 
a result of factionalism and opposing 
perceptions, every conflict is always 
debated behind closed doors and not 
transformed into antagonistic 
contradictions. This is important to ensure 
that the public sees the CCP as a solid and 
monolithic organization. 
With the entrance of this factionalism, 
although it seemed that the Shanghai 
faction had the upper hand with the 
election of Xi Jinping, he still is the result of 
a compromise between the two factions. 
The distribution of power between the two 
factions is reflected by the election of Xi 
who had to be accompanied by a figure 
who would become prime minister, namely 
Li Keqiang—a follower of tuanpai. Thus, the 
present is, in fact, a collective leadership. 
Gone are the days of dominant leaders or 
dictators of Mao and Deng Xiaoping's 
caliber.  
 
 
Various challenges facing Xi Jinping  
 
There are still many issues to be dealt 
with in China under the leadership of Xi. As 
a person who  has just made his entrance 
into the stage of leadership, he still needs 
time to consolidate his power. For that he 
still has to use " give and take" tactics in 
order to secure his position and to gain the 
support of the opposing factions, especially 
tuanpai and haipai. Based on the analysis 
that Xi Jinping’s leadership is the result of a 
compromise, the following are the greatest 
challenges he will have to face.  
 
Politics and Ideology 
 
On the surface, the fall of Bo Xilai, who 
glorified Mao Zedong and desired to revive 
his teachings, was a blow to the Maoism 
revival movement. Hence, long before the 
opening of the Congress of the CCP, 
international observers predicted that the 
CCP congress would, among others, throw 
out Maoism as it was no longer relevant to 
the reform path taken by China. 
However, Mu Chunshun, a Chinese 
analyst has come up with a different 
opinion. Mu endorses the idea that reform 
is no longer linked to Maoism, but he 
argues that observers are going too far or 
being too wishful when they think that the 
CCP will abandon Maoism. Because, said 
Mu futher, if they do that, its social impact 
will be huge. Disposing of Maoism will give 
the party a bad image in the eyes of the 
people, since if that happens, it will only go 
to show that the leadership of the Party is 
not  monolithic. Mu said that the reason 
was that Maoism is the symbol of the unity 
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of national leadership regardless of whether 
it is relevant or not to present-day China 
(Mu 2012). 
Abandoning Maoism will also cause 
dissatisfaction among the army. It must be 
noted, Mu added, for example, that the 
doctrine adopted by the People's Liberation 
Army (PLA) has never been changed. It is 
the concept that "political power comes out 
of the barrel of the gun, but the gun must 
remain under the control of the Party" (Mu 
2012). 
It is important to keep in mind that the 
army, together with the Party and the 
bureaucracy, is one of the pillars of political 
power in China. PLA acts as the security 
guard or body guard of the Party, and it is 
evidenced by the way it did not hesitate to 
suppress demonstrations that threatened 
the Party in June 1989.  
In other words, Maoism is still relevant. 
Those are the ideological challenges Xi will 
face. The speculation of Western observers 
were way off target. The results of the 
Party’s Congress barely touched issues 
relating to ideology. However, this does not 
mean that the problem of ideology has been 
resolved, because the main problem lies in 
its position among the people and leaders of 
China. 
The introduction of economic reforms 
that actually implement a capitalist system 
has resulted in a race to pursue material 
gains among the people and also widened 
the gap between the rich and poor, between 
urban and rural areas.   
As a result there has been an erosion in 
ideology which in turn poses a threat to the 
position of the CCP because the ruling 
party's monopoly of power is based on the 
principles of Marxism-Leninism- Mao 
Zedong’s Thoughts.  
This threat will continue to overshadow 
the CCP even if it is trying to mask the 
implementation of this capitalist principle 
behind such terms as  "socialism with 
Chinese characteristics" and"socialist 
market economy". Capitalism has pushed 
socialism/communism to the back seat and 
to overcome this tendency, the Chinese 
authorities have tried to promote 
nationalism among the masses and the 
youth, particularly after the 1989 
Tian’anmen incident. But this has brought 
its its own problems which will be 
discussed in the final part of this paper. 
 
Economy 
 
The next challenge is the economy. 
Analysts generally say that in the last two 
years of the reform era that has actually 
been going on for more than three decades, 
there has been a tendency of a slowing 
down in China's economy.  
This is not caused by mismanagement of 
the Chinese leaders, but rather caused by 
the global economic crisis, particularly in 
America and Europe as the lifeblood of 
China’s economy depends to a greater part 
on exports to both those continents in 
particular. During the crisis, the two 
continents that are China's export targets 
are no longer able to absorb all the Chinese 
commodities as in previous years. 
Economists believe that one solution to 
overcome this is to increase the ability of 
domestic consumers to accommodate 
China's own products. The old slogan 
"made in China" must now be replaced by a 
new "made by Chinese for the Chinese ". 
However, to achieve this, the government 
should first of all make efforts to increase 
the purchasing power of domestic 
consumers. The population which is 
approaching 1.4 billion people is a paradise 
for their own products. 
However, increasing the prosperity of 
the grassroots will be a subject of debate 
among the elite, i.e. those who want to 
enlarge the “pie of development” in 
opposition to the populist faction that 
aspires to improve the living standards of 
the people by distributing the results of 
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development more evenly. But, given the 
importance of strengthening the purchasing 
power of domestic consumers, there is a 
possibility that Xi’s economic policy will 
lean towards the League faction.  
However, in order to maintain the 
image of a monolithic leadership, he will 
also have to pay attention to the Shanghai 
faction. According to analysts, Xi’s 
economic policy will be more inclined 
towards the Shanghai faction, although he 
also has to listen to the expert advice of the 
tuanpai (Steinbock 2012).  
This has to do with the collective 
leadership system will inevitably require Xi 
to consider the opinions of his colleagues. 
Closely related to the question above, is 
how to educate Chinese consumers to better 
appreciate their own domestic products. 
Changing consumer attitude is quite a big 
challenge. 
Restructuring the roles of state 
enterprises in the Chinese economy will 
also pose a challenge. According to 
statistics, at present, state owned enterprises 
account for more than 60% of the economic 
activity and circulation of money. In other 
words, the PRC are implementing a state 
capitalist system. And similar to conditions 
in other developing countries, state 
enterprises are also a source of corruption in 
China. 
There are many more economic 
problems that Xi must face. Among others, 
the swelling local government debts and the 
aging population of China which will 
become a burden for the economy. It has 
been argued that the one family one child 
policy should be changed into two children 
for each family. However, this change in 
policy will lead to huge economic and social 
consequences because even with the present 
policy the country's total population has 
reached approximately 1.4 billion. 
 
 
 
Demands for "Democratization" 
 
Increasingly strong demands of the 
grassroots for a system of government that 
is more open, more "democratic" and more 
attentive to public interests also need to be 
dealt with. Dissatisfaction was associated 
with a violation of civil rights, such as 
punishment without trial, the appropriation 
of the people’s rightfully owned land in the 
form of "freeing" of land for the sake of 
"development" and various other violations. 
It should also be noted, there were 
violations of the rights of the minorities in 
Tibet and Xinjiang. 
This is closely linked with the 
constitution that had actually been 
approved by the National People's 
Congress (NPC) in 1982. The process began 
with disappointment and upheavals over 
various violations of laws during the 
Cultural Revolution campaigns (1966-1976).  
CCP leaders who survived the atrocities 
and violence that took place during the 
campaign concluded that it was essential 
for China to have a constitution that 
respects individual rights and also ensures 
that rulers be subject to this rule of law. The 
times when tyrants could exercise power 
and control irresponsibly should be 
terminated. It should be noted that this 
attitude was not implemented as a direct 
criticism of the policies adopted by Mao. 
In fact the constitution was never 
effective and various offenses were still 
committed by people in power. But, now 
the demands for the realization of a state 
and a government that follow the rule of 
law are becoming more forceful. Actually 
these demands are a reaction to Xi’s various 
speeches which invariably stressed the need 
to enforce the enactment of the constitution.  
In line with this, approximately 72 
intellectuals submitted a petition to push 
the Party to uphold the constitution." We 
are in agreement that constitutionalism 
should be a central issue in the reform 
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program," said Zhang Qianfan, professor of 
law at Beijing University who drafted the 
petition.  
He further stated that economic factors 
were far too dominant in the reform 
program in the past. But, from experience 
over the last 20 years, Zhang said that the 
economic reforms could go wrong if they 
were not offset by meaningful political 
reforms which imply constitutional reform 
(Wong and Ansfield 2013).  
The echoes of these demands were 
reverberated even louder by the 
newspapers and other media supporting  
reforms, including a journal issued by the 
central party cadre school once headed by 
Xi Jinping. But the petitioners were actually 
stimulated by a speech in which Xi said that 
among others, that the constitution should 
be a legal weapon for the people to defend 
their rights. 
Deng Yuwen, a newspaper editor, has 
boldly said he has not seen Xi take any 
concrete steps to make the constitution 
work. "The Constitution cannot be 
implemented by mere talk,"said Deng 
(Wong and Ansfield 2013).  
Indeed, since occupying the highest 
position in the country, although he has 
talked a lot about the importance of 
freedom, Xi has placed more emphasis on 
the importance of internal party discipline. 
He keeps reminding people that China 
should avoid repeating the fate that led to 
the break up of the Soviet Union. 
Thus, the issue of freedom will again 
stumble into something very basic: Deng 
Xiaoping only introduced economic reforms 
since his ultimate goal was to preserve the 
power of the communist party. His 
successors continue this principle. 
 
Social Issues 
 
Because she has embraced the capitalist 
system, China has also been infected by the 
various diseases of capitalism. Take for 
instance, the gap in wealth between the 
coastal and inland regions. Actually, the 
government has made many breakthroughs 
to bridge the gap between the rich regions 
and the backward regions, particularly by 
building infrastructures.  
Many remote areas are already open 
and connected to the urban areas (Johnson 
2013). However, China is so vast with a 
population so large that many more efforts 
should be made to overcome this. In the 
Mao era, political campaigns were carried 
out to bridge the urban-rural gap. Now this 
method can no longer be used. 
Closely related to the above is the rich-
poor gap. Only few Chinese people with the 
capacity to be global player that are able to 
enjoy the fruits of economic reform. In a 
capitalist system in which the rules of the 
game have not been fixed like that of China, 
money synergizes with power.  
There are allegations made by the lower 
classes that in such a wild system, where 
the rich are getting richer and the poor 
poorer, a contributing factor is corruption. 
This will all lead to jealousy and social 
unrest. How to overcome a habit that has 
been embedded in the system for over 20 
years is a big challenge for the CCP and its 
leaders. 
Another common phenomenon is the 
clearing of slum areas in urban districts to 
be turned into modern residential areas and 
business centers. The evictions to free those 
slum areas have resulted in protests and 
social tensions. One of the events that got 
the world’s attention is the displacement 
that occurred in a small town, Wukan, near 
Guangzhou, in the Guangdong province. 
As a result of the massive protests of the 
local residents, the evictions were 
postponed. This event is described as the 
people's victory over the capitalization of 
residential areas. 
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Party Relations and the Masses 
 
Xi Jinping faces another big task no less 
important, namely, putting back the CCP in 
the hearts of the people. In the past, 
especially when Mao was still alive, the 
party was still very close to the people. To 
maintain such a relationship Mao created a 
concept known as the mass line (cunzhong 
zhongxian). The cadres were instructed to 
listen to all complaints and wishes of the 
masses so that the party would not be 
isolated from the people. Internally, Mao 
applied the Leninist principle known as 
democratic centralism (Waller 1981). 
The concept demanded the leadership 
of the Party to inform all levels of 
administration under their supervision of 
the plan-making policies to be pursued. 
Thus, all units were asked to discuss the 
party's policy plans and submit suggestions 
or objections. However, once a decision had 
been taken, all party elements ranging from 
the highest to the lowest units had to 
comply with the policies and implement 
them. 
During the time when the CCP was in 
control, in the framework of the mass line 
concept, Mao always involved the masses in 
all political campaigns pertaining to both 
domestic and international issues.  
Starting in the early 1950s until his 
death in 1976, Mao and his supporters 
launched a series of mass campaigns. As a 
result, on the one hand people became very 
literate in politics, but on the other hand 
they also became tired of the never-ending 
mass campaigns. 
After Mao's departure and after Deng 
Xiaoping came to power, the number of 
mass campaigns was greatly reduced. 
However, because the masses were not 
involved, politics became an elite 
movement.  
Occasional mass action was launched 
but under very tight control. An example of 
this was the anti-American demonstrations 
in 1999 when American planes accidentally 
bombed the PRC Embassy in Belgrade. 
However, the demonstrations were 
eventually stopped because there were 
visible signs that the Chinese government 
was also becoming one of the targets of the 
demonstrations.  
Strict control over all kinds of mass 
action was applied after the 1989 
Tian’anmen demonstrations which almost 
caused the breakup of the CCP due to 
internal conflicts. Thus, one of the major 
tasks that Xi Jinping must shoulder is 
putting the party back in the hearts of the 
people without threatening the CCP 
monopoly of power. 
 
 
Nationalism 
 
Nationalism emerged at the end of the 
19th century when there was a hot debate 
among Chinese elite regarding the question 
on how to come out of national crisis and 
humiliation.  All parties basically agreed 
that the fundamental reason for the crisis 
was the presence of Western colonialism 
and the weakness of Qing Dynasty.   
On how to come out of the crisis, 
however, they have different opinions. 
Some thought that the main cause was the 
backwardness of Chinese military and 
weaponry power, and thus they 
campaigned for “learning from foreigners” 
(read West) or yangwu yundong and “Self 
Strengthening Movement.” Others urged 
for “keeping Chinese thinking as national 
identity while using Western technology for 
practical means”(Zhongxue wei ti, Xixue wei 
yong). 
There were also groups which 
advocated anarchism, while two Confucian 
scholars, Kang Youwei and his disciple 
Liang Qichao, spread the idea of 
constitutional monarchy system copying 
from England. Of all the popular ideas 
which came out at that time, mostly wanted 
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to maintain monarchy system. It was during 
these fierce debates Dr. Sun Yatsen came up 
with a radical thought: the Qing Dynasty 
was a foreign conquerer and a colonialist 
power, it had to be overthown and China 
should establish a republic state based on 
Chinese nationalism.  
It was under the leadership of Dr. Sun 
the Qing Dynasty was abolished by 1911 
Revolution (Xinhai Geming) and a republic 
was later created (Lin 2011). However, 
Chinese nationalism remained buried for 
quite a long time and only reappeared on 
Mainland China in the last 30 years, 
particularly after the introduction of Deng 
Xiaoping’s reform. It is important to note 
that since the PRC was founded in 1949, the 
only ideology for the government and the 
people is Communism/Socialism or better 
known as Marxis-Leninism and the 
Thought of Mao. 
However, Marxism-Leninism and the 
Thought of Mao seems not have anymore 
place in the hearts of most of the people as a 
result of Mao's policies that imposed the 
principle of "politics in command" 
especially after 1957.  
Since then for the next 20 years, Mao for 
the sake of realizing his ideals of creating a 
socialist society, launched a series of mass 
campaigns  ranging from the Great Leap 
Forward (Da Yuejin), the Socialist Education 
Movement, the People's Communes 
(Renmin Gongshe), which peaked in 1966 
with the start of the Cultural Revolution 
(Zichanjieji Wenhua da Geming).  
The last campaigns was the greatest, 
longest (about 10 years), and with a large 
number of victims and only stopped after 
Mao’s death. During the series of mass 
campaigns all the elements of society that 
opposed Mao were considered "counter-
revolutionaries" and put to jail or killed. The 
victims included his comrade in arms in 
fighting to establish the CCP and the PRC. 
Only two years after Mao died in 1976, 
after successfully eliminating the Maoists,  
Deng Xiaoping introduced reform and 
opening of China up as well as the capitalist 
economicsystem (Tyler 1997). As a result, 
because of the cruelty of the Maoist system, 
almosteveryone in China welcomed reform 
and was encouraged to pursue material 
gains. Consequently, socialist ideologies 
were marginalized.   
With the end of the Cultural Revolution 
era and the introduction of the capitalist 
system, some segments of Chinese society, 
particularly students and intelectuals 
tempted to follow an Western liberal 
democracy. This culminated in a series of 
demonstrations during the Spring and 
Summer of 1989, followed by the 
Tian’anmen massacre, in June 1989. That is 
understandable because Deng’s main 
objective to introduce reforms was precisely 
to preserve and strengthen CCP’s grip over 
Chinese society. 
In the aftermath of the Tian’anmen 
massacre, nationalism that had long been 
neglected secured a place for itself again. 
The state played an important role in its 
resurgence. The general public, especially 
school children, students and young 
children were brainwashed with 
nationalism and a sense of pride in being 
Chinese.  
The Army, wherever they are, usually 
has a high sense of nationalism and 
patriotism. The switch to nationalism was 
relatively easy, because the Chinese are 
traditionally known as a people who are 
highly chauvinistic. The success of China 
hosting the Olympics Games in 2008, was 
regarded as the pinnacle of the Chinese 
government’s success in inculcate this 
nationalist sentiment.  
However, an overdose of nationalism 
will lead to xenophobia and could backfire. 
Anti-foreign nationalism could turn into a 
mass movement against the government if 
the authorities are considered not 
"assertive" enough or seen as to be weak 
under foreign pressure. For example, in 
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1999 when the American bombers 
accidentally dropped bombs on the Chinese 
embassy, mass anti-American 
demonstrations were staged in many major 
cities. American representative offices were 
vandalized; pelted with stones and Molotov 
cocktails (Sina News 1999).  
Demonstrations became increasingly 
violent when the Chinese government 
seemed to lack force in its protest against 
America. Worried that the demonstrations 
would turn into anti-government such as 
those in Tian’anmen in 1989, the authorities 
took immediate measures to stop the mass 
action. Since then it seemed that all the mass 
movements were orchestrated by the 
government.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper deals with series of obstacles 
faced by Xi Jinping as new Chinese leader 
and we can conclude that there are many 
enormous challeges he is facing. One of the 
obstacles that he has to deal with is the fact, 
although seems to be powerful, he is still a 
leader emerged as the result of compromise 
among factions within the CCP.  
Consequently, decision making will take 
more time since it has to be discussed 
among factions. 
So, how  should  Xi Jinping,  as the new 
leader, face public pressure in China’s 
conflict with Southeast Asian countries and 
Japan over overlapping claims in the South 
China Sea and East China Sea? In 
accordance with the principle of collective 
leadership and the principle of 
"consultation and consensus", in all issues, 
both domestic and international, he must 
obtain the consent of both factions holding 
political power today. Whatever steps Xi 
takes, he must have the blessings of all the 
factions and because he has only been in 
this new leadership, Xi needs time to spread 
his influence among party leaders as well as 
the army and masses. 
There are opinions that the claim on the 
South China Sea is a legacy of Hu Jintao. 
There is a custom in China for a leader 
stepping down to leave "a legacy" to be 
continued by his successor. Mao’s legacy 
was his thoughts, Deng Xiaoping’s was his  
reforms, Jiang Zemin left his three 
representations, and Hu Jintao bequeath the 
harmonious society concept and claims over 
the Diaoyutai (Senkaku).  
Thus, in this case Xi seems to be  facing 
a difficult choice. With the nationalist 
sentiment surging, especially among the 
youth and army, taking no compromise will 
put him in a difficult position. If he takes a 
step that is considered a compromise, he 
will have to answer to his own people. 
If he chooses confrontation, not only the 
will the world suffer from the 
consequences, but also China itself. The 
strategy he is using in ASEAN is divide et 
impera or divide and rule. Through 
economic aid, Xi has successfully 
“persuaded” Cambodia to dismiss the 
agenda to discuss the issue of overlapping 
claims in the South China Sea at the ASEAN 
summit recently.  
But, if this policy is maintained, 
neighboring countries who strongly 
support the agenda, especially Vietnam and 
the Philippines, will certainly turn to the 
US. China gain the image of a big country 
that wants to restore its hegemony in the 
Southern Hemisphere. 
A confrontational attitude would also be 
contrary to the principle of peaceful rising 
propagated since China's rise to 
superpower, both in terms of military and 
economic power. The principle states that 
China’sascent into a world power is to seek 
peace through the principle of peaceful 
coexistence with other countries, not to 
practice hegemony. The situation in China 
faced by Xi Jinping regarding the role of 
ideology is reflected in an ancient saying: 
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nationalism can be a double-edged sword.  
It can be used against enemies, but it also 
can injure the owner. 
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